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THE RELIABILITY OF CARD CHECKS IN ESTABLISHING
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE STATUS
I. INTRODUCTION
An election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board among a group
of previously unorganized employees has long been the normal procedure by
which a union may become the designated collective bargaining representative
for those employees.1 Recently, however, an alternative method of establishing
representative status has been used with greater frequency by unions engaged
in organization.2 Under this alternative method, the union solicits authorization
cards from a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, informs their
employer of the existence of such cards, and requests recognition as bargaining
representative. The employer is obligated to bargain with the union unless he
has a good faith doubt as to the validity of the union's majority status or as to
the appropriateness of the proposed unit. The obligation to bargain arises out
of section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, which states: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain col-
lectively with the representatives of his employees . . . 2-3 This statutory lan-
guage has been interpreted by the courts to impose a duty upon the employer
to bargain with a union once it "presents convincing evidence of majority sup-
port." 4 Authorization cards have been held to constitute such evidence, r whether
they take the form of an explicit designation of the union as the employee's
bargaining representative, 6 regular union membership cards,7 applications for
union membership,8 or even authorizations for the check-off of union dues.9 If
1. The procedure for election and certification is found in the National Labor Relations
Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964). When the union files a petition with the Board showing
that at least 30% of the employees in the proposed bargaining unit are interested either In
representation by the union or in an election, the Board, if it finds the unit appropriate
and the expression of interest reasonably valid, conducts a secret ballot election within the
unit. The election may call upon the employees to choose between two or more unions, or
to simply decide whether they wish any union representation at all. If a union receives a
majority of votes cast, the Board certifies it as the exclusive bargaining representative for
all members of the unit, and the employer must bargain with it. See 1968 CCH Guidebook
to Labor Relations §§ 400-12.
2. See statistics noted in Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB
Election, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 851, n.1 (1967).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
4. NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940). See also
NLRB v. Philamon Laboratories Inc., 298 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919
(1962); NLRB v. Sunrise Lumber & Trim Corp., 241 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 818 (1957).
5. NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940).
6. NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964
(1955); NLRB v. Howell Chevrolet Co., 204 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), aft'd, 346 U.S. 482 (1953).
7. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
914 (1951); NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
8. NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318 (1940); NLRB v. Consolidated Mach.
Tool Corp., 163 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 US. 824 (1947).
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the employer rejects the evidentiary significance of the cards, the union can
present them to a neutral third party for the purpose of checking the signatures
against payroll records.10 If more than 50% of the signatures on the cards are
found valid, the employer must bargain or expose himself to a charge of having
violated section 8(a) (5). 1" If, upon petition to the Board by the union, the
employer is found to have lacked a "good faith doubt" as to the union's major-
ity status or as to the appropriateness of the unit, and if the union actually did
have majority status in an appropriate unit, a bargaining order will issue with-
out an election.' 2
Therefore, it is unlikely that a well-advised employer will summarily reject
cards which he can see contain the valid signatures of a majority of the employ-
ees in the proposed unit. It is even more unlikely that he will reject cards which
have been checked by a third party. In the cases where such cards are rejected,
the employer's usual contention is that some of the cards should be invalidated
because of the methods used in obtaining them. It is the employer's argument
in these cases that, despite the authenticity of the signatures, some of the em-
ployees did not actually wish to designate the union as their bargaining repre-
sentative, thereby bringing into question the union's alleged majority status.
Everytime an employer makes such a contention, he questions the reliability of
authorization cards and the fairness of union organizational methods.
A representation election conducted by the Board must be held in circum-
stances free from any coercion under what the Board terms "laboratory condi-
tions."' 3 When a bargaining order is issued solely on the basis of a card check,
the "laboratory conditions" surrounding a secret ballot election are necessarily
replaced by the solicitation techniques surrounding the organizational drive for
signed cards. Commenting upon the effect of such techniques on the trustworthi-
ness of card checks, the Fourth Circuit has recently stated: "It would be diffi-
cult to imagine a more unreliable method of ascertaining the real wishes of
employees than a 'card check,' unless it were an employer's request for an open
show of hands."' 4 While this exaggerates the situation, it is true that certain
coercive acts and misrepresentations are often used in obtaining the signatures
of employees. In direct contradiction to its policy of closely scrutinizing the con-
ditions surrounding an election, the Board has usually ignored these acts and
misrepresentations by upholding almost any card with a valid signature. The
9. Lebanon Steel Foundry v. NLRB, 130 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 US. 659
(1942).
10. See NLRB v. George Groh & Sons, 329 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1964).
11. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
12. See, e.g., Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); Colson Corp., 148 N.L.R.B.
827 (1964), enforced, 347 F2d 128 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 904 (1965). In a more
unusual situation, a bargaining order will issue even though the employer had a good faith
doubt, if it is found that the employer committed unfair labor practices so flagrant as to
make a fair election impossible. See J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB, 384 F2d 479 (10th Cir.
1967).
13. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
14. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1967). This harsh
view of NLRB bargaining orders has been rejected by other courts, eg., Thrift Drug Co. v.
NLR,, 404 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1968).
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circuit courts, on the other hand, have rejected the Board's policy by invalidat-
ing cards they find to have been unfairly solicited.15 Despite consistent reversals
by the courts, the Board has remained firm in its policy and has thereby created
the necessity for an employer to appeal his case twice' 0 before obtaining what
he and the courts consider to be a just decision.17
II. COMMON MISREPRESENTATIONS
A. Purpose of the Card
A review of recent NLRB and court decisions reveals that the most common
misrepresentation made by solicitors is that the purpose of the card is to present
the showing of interest necessary to obtaining a representation election.' 8 The
employee is told that "the purpose of the cards is to get a vote" or "if we get
enough cards we will ask the Board to hold an election." The effect of this mis-
representation on the validity of the card was originally considered in NLRB v.
Cumberland Shoe Corp.10 Known as the "Cumberland rule," the court stated
that a card would be invalid if the organizer or campaign literature used words
akin to "sole" or "only." In other words, for the card to be invalidated, it must
have been represented to the signer that the card would be used only as part of
a showing of interest necessary to get an election.
20
In a recent case concerning election misrepresentations, 2' the Fourth Circuit
refused to enforce the Board's bargaining order, holding that the union never
had legitimate majority status because the employees had signed the cards un-
der misrepresentations as to their purpose. The misrepresentations arose at a
meeting where the organizer, after referring to an election, had answered ques-
15. For a discussion of the criticism that the Board's approach has experienced from the
courts, see Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union Major-
ity, 16 Lab. L.J. 434 (1965).
16. Board cases are first beard by an independent trial examiner who is bound by Board
law. His determination is appealable to the Board as a matter of right. The Board's decision
may then be appealed by right to a circuit court of appeals.
17. The Supreme Court has finally taken cognizance of the differing credence given au-
thorization cards not only between the Board and the circuit courts but even between dif-
ferent circuits. It agreed to decide NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 393 U.S. 997 (1968) and NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir.), cart.
granted, 393 U.S. 997 (1968). In Gissel, the court refused to enforce a bargaining order,
holding the employer had a good faith doubt of the union's majority status despite evidenco
presented him in the form of a majority of signed cards, since cards are "such unreliable
indicators." 398 F.2d at 337. In Sinclair, the court, when faced with an almost identical
situation, enforced the bargaining order. 397 F.2d at 161-62. Perhaps the Supreme Court's
decision in these cases will clarify what reliance should be given cards in the future and will
give some direction to the effort to regulate their solicitation.
18. See Chief Judge Haynsworth's brief discussion of various misrepresentations In
NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 565-66 (4th Cir. 1967).
19. 351 F.2d 917, 920 (6th Cir. 1965).
20. See the procedure outlined in note 1 supra.




tions in such a manner as to indicate that he assumed there would be a secret
ballot election.22 In addition, the organizer stated at an organization committee
meeting that the cards "would be used first to obtain an election" and that the
signers were not members until the election had been won and a contract nego-
tiated.23 The court found the issue to be not the words used, but "whether the
cards were signed as a power to the union to act for the employees." 24 Concern-
ing the narrow "Cumberland rule" followed by the Board, the court stated:
"Despite the regard we hold for the contrary opinion . . . we will not stick
mechanically to the literal phrasing of the cards. A ghost of the parol evidence
rule, such literalism subordinates what really counts: the actual understanding
of the signers." 25
In NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co.,2 6 the Second Circuit was asked to enforce a
bargaining order based on a card check and on a finding that the employer
lacked a good faith doubt as to the union's majority when he refused to bargain.
The court refused to enforce the order because there were enough invalid cards
to destroy the union's majority. Although recognizing that the cards dearly
stated that the signer authorized the union to represent him for purposes of col-
lective bargaining, Judge Friendly, delivering the opinion of the court, observed
that such written clarity "should constitute [only] the beginning of any effort
to show a majority on the basis of authorization cards" and that "the clearest
written words can be perverted by oral misrepresentations, especially to ordi-
nary working people unversed in the 'witty diversities' of labor law."2 " There-
fore, the court looked beyond the language of the cards to the representations
made by the organizers in obtaining signatures.
Two of the cards challenged in Nichols were attacked because of misrepre-
sentations that their purpose was to obtain an election.28 One employee was
told that there would have to be an election and that she would be able to change
her mind if she wanted to by voting against the union. The second employee was
told that the cards were needed for presentation to the government "for a vote,"
and that a voting booth would be set up. Neither card was counted by the court
because both employees were led to believe that the cards were merely prepara-
tory to a vote, and neither employee understood that they were authorizing the
union to act as their representative by signing the card.2 9 A third card was in-
validated because the signer was told that the cards would be used to bring
about an investigation of working conditions. When the signer asked if the card
was for an election she was told by the organizer that it was "'not necessarily
for an election, that it could be for an election if we couldn't reach a majority
22. Id. at 371.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 372.
26. 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967).
27. Id. at 442.
28. There were other cards challenged and invalidated for reasons not germane to this
discussion.
29. 380 F.2d at 444.
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status to make our demand for recognition upon the company.' "80 The court
found that this explanation was insufficient because it failed to make it clear
that the union could claim to be the exclusive bargaining agent on the strength
of a majority card check and without the need for an election.81
In recent years, other circuits have similarly invalidated cards induced by
election misrepresentations.8 2 In fact, the Sixth Circuit (which originally laid
down the "Cumberland rule") has now discontinued the requirement that the
words "sole" or "only" be used in order to bring about invalidation. In NLRB
v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 3 one card was invalidated because of a statement
by the solicitor to the effect that there would be a secret vote, and another was
invalidated because, when the signer said she was against the union, the solicitor
assured her that "he was trying to get a percentage of the girls to sign the cards
so they could come in and vote for the union .... ,"4 Indeed, among the circuit
courts faced with the issue, it appears that only the District of Columbia Circuit
continues to adhere to the "Cumberland rule."3 rs
Nearly all the cases which invalidate cards because of election misrepresenta-
tions cite NLRB v. Stow Manufacturing Co.,80 where Judge Learned Hand dis-
30. Id. at 443.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lake Butler Apparel Co., 392 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968); Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v.
NLRB, 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967); Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB,
358 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1966).
33. 384 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1967).
34. Id. at 616.
35. United Automobile Workers v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 857 (1967). The court therein expressed concern that any other rule would require a
court to adjudge the credibility of each witness. It also questioned the reliability of testi-
mony of employees given under the eye of company officials. Judge Friendly answered
these two arguments recently in his concurring opinion in Bryant Chucking Grinder Co. v.
NLRB, 389 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 908 (1968). On the issue of
witness credibility he argued that: "[T]his could hardly have meant that the Cumberland
rule avoids these tasks; it simply narrows the scope of inquiry to whether the solicitor used
a particular form of words. Furthermore, . . . judges reviewing agency action do not
'adjudge the credibility of each witness' or 'weigh the evidence.' While ease of review is
indeed desirable, this can never justify narrowing the inquiry to eliminate relevant facts
... " 389 F.2d at 570. On the question of the reliability of employee testimony, Judge
Friendly noted that while it is "somewhat suspect, there is no reason to suppose the testimony
of union organizers is any less so. So far as memory is concerned, an employee would seem
rather more likely to be able to recall what was said to him than an organizer would be to
remember what he said to each of scores of employees in many campaigns ... ." Id. at 570 n.2.
The following decisions are recent examples of the circuit courts (other than the District of
Columbia) which have been presented with the issue and which have uniformly not followed
the "Cumberland rule." NLRB v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968);
Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners,
Inc., 384 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967);
Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967); Bauer Welding and
Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1966).
36. 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
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cussed the effect such misrepresentations have on the designation of a bargain-
ing representative. He pointed out that if the signer looked upon the card only
as a request for an election at which he would be free to vote as he pleased, his
act in signing could not be considered a designation of the union as his repre-
sentative.37 Therefore, if the union organizer contributed to this misapprehen-
sion in any way, the authorization card should not be used to establish majority
status no matter how plain it is on its face. The Nichols decision observed that
employees who believe that they can later vote secretly will sign cards during an
organizational drive to avoid retaliation or harassment, all the while intending
to vote against the union or at least to reserve decision.38 Their motive is obvi-
ously inconsistent with an authorization card that purports to designate the
union as their bargaining agent and, if the organizer is responsible for the sign-
ers' mistaken beliefs, the cards should be invalidated.
B. Initiation Fees
A common "promise" made by a union organizer during a campaign is not
to exact initiation fees from those who sign cards. Such a statement may con-
stitute either a misrepresentation or an illegal inducement, depending upon the
particular facts involved.39 Often, all the members of a unit for which a union
is certified as representative are not liable for initiation fees upon joining the
union if they were employees at the time of certification, whether or not they
signed cards during the organization campaign. 40 Only employees joining the
unit after certification might be required to pay an initiation fee. In such cases,
a representation that the employee could avoid a fee by signing a card during
the campaign would be false. Another common policy is that all new members
must pay a fee. In that case, the promise not to exact a fee is an illegal induce-
ment,41 akin to bribery.
In NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez & Morell, S. en C., the Board petitioned for
enforcement of a bargaining order based on a card check. The authorization
cards in question contained the following statement: "NON PAYMENT OF
INITIATION FEE Those who join now shall never have to pay an initiation
fee. Those who wait until the contract is signed, shall have to pay the regular
initiation fee." 43 The union actually had no initiation fee, although this fact
was not determinative. The court pointed out that the offering of improper in-
ducements by a union in order to attract membership is just as illegal as an
37. Id. at 902.
38. 380 F.2d at 445.
39. See NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez & Morell, S. en C., 328 F.2d 679, 682 (1st Cir. 1964).
40. See Gilmore Indus., Inc. 140 N.L.R.B. 100 (1962), enforcement denied, 341 F2d 240
(6th Cir. 1965), and cases cited in iNLRB v. Gorbea, Perez & Aforell, S. en C., 300 F2d
886, 888 (1st Cir. 1962).
41. See NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez & Morell, S. en C., 328 F.2d 679, 682-83 (1st Cir.
1964), where the court, in commenting on such a promise, said: "We do not have here a
genuine waiver supported by the economic reasons advanced by the Board with the induc-
ing effects merely a concomitant incident. Rather, we have an inducement e.xpressly sought
for its own sake; a bold attempt to buy membership at a phonily [sic] reduced rate."
42. 300 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1962).
43. Id. at 887.
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employer's offers of improper inducements made to discourage membership. 44
It reasoned that the waiving of initiation fees before an election may be a harm-
less way of buying cards for the showing of interest necessary to obtain an elec-
tion, but that such a waiver ceases to be harmless when the union has paid for
the votes it needed. 45 Apparently it makes no difference whether the promise of
waiver is a misrepresentation or an inducement because, in either event, it con-
stitutes an illegal purchase of votes where the cards are used as the basis of a
bargaining order. On remand, the Board affirmed its decision to issue a bargain-
ing order, and the case went back to the First Circuit.40 This time, the court
refused enforcement, holding that the promise not to charge an initiation fee was
an improper and illegal inducement as well as a serious misrepresentation.
4T
Thus, while the Board viewed the promise as irrelevant, the court held that it
invalidated the authorization cards as an illegal purchase of votes.
Many analagous statements by union organizers as to waiver of fees and dues
have since been held to have been improper inducements or misrepresentations.
In NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc.,48 a card was invalidated be-
cause the signer was told that if he did not sign the card, and the union was later
certified or recognized, he would have to pay increased union dues.49 In NLRB
v. Gilmore Industries, Inc.,50 an election won by the union was set aside because
the union had offered to waive an initiation fee (rumored to be $300) in the
event that it won.
There is no judicial conflict of authority where the initiation fee representa-
tion is false. While the Board is willing to ignore this misrepresentation, all the
circuits have invalidated cards so induced. However, where the promise is only
an inducement (where there is a fee to avoid) there is some disagreement among
the circuits.51 The Board has consistently held that as long as the reduced rate
is available to all employees, the inducement does not vitiate signed cards. 2
Again, the conflict between the Board and the courts as to misrepresentations
concerning fees, and the conflict among the circuits as to using waiver of fees as
inducements, should be resolved so that an employer knows when he may reject
cards in good faith.
C. A Majority Has Already Signed
Another common misrepresentation made by union organizers to prospective
signers is that a majority of the employees in the unit have already signed. In
44. Id.
45. Id. at 888.
46. 328 F.2d 679 (1st Cir. 1964).
47. Id. at 682-83.
48. 380 F.2d 851 (1st Cir. 1967).
49. Id. at 856.
50. 341 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1965).
51. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1965), wherein
a bargaining order was upheld despite initiation fee promises which were not misrepresenta-
tions. Judge Friendly criticized this point in the decision but concurred because the union
had 90 cards in a unit of 120 employees.
52. See General Steel Prods., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 636 (1966), modified, 398 F.2d 339
(4th Cir. 1968); Gafner Automotive & Machine, Inc., 156 NL.R.B. 577 (1966), enforced,
400 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1968).
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NLRB v. H. Rohtstein & Co.,53 the Board had issued a bargaining order based
on eight signed cards in a unit of fifteen. One employee testified that he signed
the card because when he asked the solicitor if anybody else had signed, the so-
licitor answered that the union had "got the majority." The Board had held that
the statement, although untrue, did not affect the employee's grant of bargaining
authority. The court disagreed and refused to enforce the bargaining order,
noting that many employees, although anti-union, will want to appear to be on
what is already said to be the winning side. It refuted the Board's contention
that the employee could check to determine who had already signed by pointing
out that such a check would be too hard to carry out, even in a unit of only
fifteen employees.54
Despite other recent decisions invalidating cards induced by a misrepresenta-
tion that a majority had already signed, 5 the Board has not altered its position
regarding such misrepresentations. For example, in G & A Truck Line, Inc., 0
it held that such statements, even though relied upon by the signer, were "harm-
less sales-talk or puffing, which do not operate 'to overcome the effect of ...
[the employee's] overt action in signing.' ,,57
Some standard should be established so that the union organizer knows what
he may tell an employee who asks him how the campaign is going. The natural
desire of an employee to want to be in the "good graces" of what he believes is
already the winning side should not be allowed to negate his free choice as to
union representation.
D. Discrimination Against Non-Signing Employees
Coercion in the form of threats to discriminate against non-signers has long
been recognized by the courts as destroying the validity of authorization cards
obtained thereby. In NLRB v. Dadourian Export Corp.,5 8 three cards were in-
validated when the employees testified that they were unwilling to sign and did
not want the union, but signed because the organizer threatened them with loss
of their jobs.59 Such cases of coercion have led to a unified policy insuring free-
dom of choice. Because it is an unfair labor practice for the union to exercise
such coercion,60 any cards obtained thereby will be invalidated by both the
Board and the courts.
53. 266 F.2d 407 (1st Cir. 1959).
54. Id. at 409.
55. See, e.g., N LRB v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 390 F2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
SE. Nichols, Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967).
56. 168 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 1 21,984 (1967), enforced, 407 F2d
120 (6th Cir. 1969).
57. 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. at 28,891. The Sixth Circuit, in enforcing the bargaining
order, said that the statements "were in fact misrepresentations and not puffing. The state-
ments were false and meant to mislead the two employees." 407 F2d at 122. However, it
found the two employees in this case were not in good faith as they were former union
members and aware that the statements were likely to be false, and thus it did not inval-
idate their cards. Id. at 123.
58. 138 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1943).
59. Id. at 892. See also NLRB v. United Mineral & Chem. Corp., 391 F2d 829, 836
(2d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. James Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743, 746-48 (2d Cir. 1953).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1964).
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E. Employees Who Cannot Read English
Even in the absence of coercion or misrepresentation by union organizers, an
analogous problem arises where an employee signs a card printed in a language
with which he is unfamiliar. To effectively designate a collective bargaining
representative, the employee must understand what he is signing. It is generally
accepted by both the courts and the Board that if the card is in an unfamiliar
language and the organizer used an unfamiliar language in soliciting the em-
ployee's signature, the presumption is that the signer did not make a valid
authorization. 6 If the card is in an unfamiliar language but the organizer spoke
the signer's native tongue and explained the effect of signing to the employee,
the card is generally valid. 2 Where the card is printed in the employee's pri-
mary language, the presumption is that he intended to make a designation by
signing.63
In Brancato Iron Works, Inc.,64 the Board invalidated a card which was
printed in English and signed by an employee who understood no English. The
credited testimony of the signer was that he did not understand anything said
by the solicitor, nor did he know the purpose of the card. The solicitor testified
that he spoke to the employee in Spanish, and thought that the employee under-
stood. The Board indicated that since the intent and understanding of the em-
ployee are the relevant issues, the testimony of the employee should take prece-
dence over that of the solicitor, who thought he was making himself clear.0r
However, in NLRB v. River Togs, Inc.,00 the Board had validated cards
printed in English and signed by Polish speaking employees who could not read
or speak English. The solicitor testified that she had explained the meaning of
the cards to the employees in Polish, but the employees testified that they were
mislead into signing the cards and that they had no understanding of what the
cards were for. Although the court's decision did not necessitate a ruling on the
validity of the cards, the opinion reflects a marked disagreement with the Board
on its validation.67 Since the situation as it stands now depends to such a large
extent on whose testimony is being credited, there is too much opportunity for
abuse by both organizer and union. There is a clear necessity for some guide-
line to prevent such abuse and to help the employer determine whether the
union is really the choice of his non-English speaking employees.
F. Miscellaneous
In addition to the five misrepresentations or acts of coercion thus far dis-
cussed, there are other less common ones which sometimes arise when the issue
of the reliability of authorization cards is presented before the Board or the
61. See NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967); Brancato Iron Works,
Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 11 22,212 (1968).
62. See cases cited in note 61 supra.
63. This rule is rebuttable with proof of misrepresentations.
64. 170 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. fI 22,212 (1968).
65. Id. at 11.
66. 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967).
6"7. Id. at 204-05.
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courts. One such statement is that the card is insignificant. In NLRB v. Dan
Howard Manufacturing Co.,68 a card was invalidated because, in addition to
being told that the card was insignificant, the signer was told that the purpose
of the card was to enable her to attend union meetings. Similarly, in the Nichols
case, a card was invalidated because the solicitor said that the cards were needed
to prompt an NLRB investigation into working conditions at the plant. A vari-
ation of the misrepresentation as to an election occurs where a signer is told
that the card enables him to vote in a secret ballot election.09
The reliability of an authorization card may also be called into question in
the absence of coercion or misrepresentation. It is generally agreed that where
the signer attempts to retrieve or withdraw his card, it cannot then be used to
determine majority status.70 Similarly, cards that have been filled out but left
unsigned cannot be counted unless the employee testifies that the lack of a sig-
nature was mere inadvertence on his part.71
Im. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
There appears to be a general lack of control over unions during campaigns
to achieve recognition of majority status. While a Board-run election must be
conducted under "laboratory conditions," a campaign to attain majority status
solely through authorization cards is under no such requirement. Certain stan-
dards must be established to conform the reliability of card authorizations to
those won in elections, if both procedures are to continue to result in certifica-
tion.72 Indeed, the disparity between what the Board and the courts have found
to be permissible solicitation techniques has often forced employers to pursue
their objections to a third forum before obtaining a just result.
It must be recognized, however, that the very nature of card solicitation dis-
courages any attempt to control the oral representations of the solicitor. Any
set of rules aimed at governing what may and may not be said might result in
a credibility issue in almost every case because of the secretive conditions under
which most solicitation takes place. Similarly, a requirement that all card solici-
tation take place before witnesses would create an opportunity for employer
68. 390 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968).
69. Such a statement implies that signing the card is equivalent to registration prior
to political elections.
70. See NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1967); TMT Trailer
Ferry, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1495, 1507 (1965). A split in authority exists where the employee
attempts to withdraw his card after an unfair labor practice has been committed by his
employer. Compare NLRB v. Abrasive Salvage Co., 285 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1961), with
NLRB v. Quality Markets, Inc., 387 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1967).
71. See Shelby Mfg., 155 NL.R.B. 464, 466 (1965), modified, 390 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.
1968); Von Der Abe Van Lines, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 126, 144 (1965); I. Taitel & Son, 119
N.LR.B. 910 (1957), enforced, 261 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 US. 944
(1959).
72. While the viability of authorization card elections has been an implicit assumption
of the foregoing, it should be noted that there are those who question this assumption. See
Judge Timbers' separate opinion in NLRD v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684, 693-
703 (2d Cir. 1966); Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 Yale L.J. 80.5, 818-19 (1966).
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opposition and would, of course, defeat the element of secrecy which many un-
ions feel is necessary for a successful organization drive.78 Accepting the pre-
mise that any attempt to govern oral solicitation directly will prove unsatisfac-
tory, one is left with the possibility of formulating standards as to the cards
themselves.
Such an attempt was envisioned by Judge Friendly in the Nichols opinion:
"Bearing in mind that the function of authorization cards used as a basis for
creating a duty in the employer to recognize the union is to demonstrate that
a majority of the employees have 'clearly manifested an intention to designate
the Union as their bargaining representative,' . . . there seems to be no reason
why cards could not state in large type that if a majority signed, the union
would claim representative status without an election."7 4 Carrying this sugges-
tion one step further, the establishment of one standard card to be used by all
unions under the jurisdiction of the Board would, if correctly worded, lead to
greater employee understanding and might reduce the confusion resulting from
oral misrepresentations. 75 Such a card might contain the heading "Selection of
Union Agent," followed by a clear statement that the union is authorized to
represent the signer without the further step of an election. There should also
be blanks wherein the employee fills in the name of the union, his employer,
his own name and the date. Such blanks would avoid confusion in the event
that two or more unions are attempting to organize the same unit.70
While careful wording of the "Selection of Union Agent" card would eliminate
73. See Comment, Refusal-to-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA:
Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387, 390 (1966).
74. 380 F.2d at 442 n.4 (citations omitted).
75. This recommendation and the others made herein may be implemented by the Board
under its general rule making powers, see 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1964), or by a decision, sea
Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16 Lab.
L.J. 434, 441 n.37 (1965). Of course, should the Board fail to act, appropriate legislation
might be enacted by Congress.
76. The standard card to achieve majority status, with language borrowed from 29
U.S.C. § 159 (1964), might read:
SELECTION OF UNION AGENT
I designate as my collective bargaining representative In respect
to wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment. I understand that







some of the effects of oral misrepresentations, the establishment of a second
standardized card would help negate confusion resulting from the misrepresenta-
tions as to an election. The second card would be used only to obtain an elec-
tion, and could not be counted toward majority status for purposes of designa-
tion without an election. This card could be of a different size or color and might
contain the heading "Interest in Election," followed by a concise statement of
its effect.77 While the establishment of two separate cards might sound confus-
ing, it is to be remembered that these would be the only two kinds of cards
acceptable to employers and the Board.78 Of even greater significance, however,
is the fact that the difference between the cards would emphasize the two op-
tions open to employees. The knowledge that a "green" card means immediate
representation while a "blue" card means a Board-conducted election would
tend to destroy the confusion created by the oral representations of the solicitor.
Where the union cannot determine at the outset of the campaign whether it will
be able to obtain majority status or merely enough authorizations for a Board-
run election, employees could be solicited to sign both forms.
In addition to the adoption of standardized cards, which is aimed basically
at only one of the common misrepresentations, every union engaged in organiz-
ing activity should be required to distribute a leaflet to every employee before
taking his signature on a card. The wording of the leaflet should be approved by
the local office of the NLRB prior to distribution, and the contents should in-
clude a simple statement of the union's dues policy with the further proviso that
the union cannot financially discriminate against those who do not sign during
the campaign. The leaflet should also point out that any verbal or written prom-
ises respecting the dues policy not contained in the leaflet are completely unen-
forceable. Finally, the leaflet should make it clear that the union must represent all
77. A standard card to be used to petition the NLRB for an election could appear as
follows:
INTEREST IN ELECTION
I support 's petition for certification as the collective bargaining
representative (so as to OBTAIN AN ELECTION under the supervision of the





78. The Fifth Circuit suggested the advisability of different cards for different purpmes
in NLRB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., 342 F.2d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 1965). The court's dictum on
the subject led to specific recommendation in Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization
Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16 Lab. LJ. 434, 440-41 (1965).
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employees equally once it is certified or recognized as collective bargaining
agent. Both the cards and the leaflet should be written in the signer's language
in order to render his signature effective. 79 To insure that these leaflets are dis-
tributed, the Board might provide either that a signed card would be void
unless the signer received a leaflet first, or that an employer would be permitted
to prominently display a statement or distribute an informational flyer alleging
the union's failure to properly distribute leaflets.80
The combined effect of the standardized cards and the informational leaflets
would be to make the employees aware that certain misrepresentations are made,
and that the truth is easily ascertainable from sources other than the organizer.
While these recommendations may seem onerous to the union or to the Board
in terms of additional expense or work, all sides involved in an organizational
campaign will benefit from them. The employees will know more about what
they are signing and will have less cause to feel tricked or cheated afterwards.
The employer will have less cause to suspect the legitimacy of a card check and
will be faced with a more uniform policy with respect to the validity of signed
cards. The Board will be operating under a more defined policy toward card
checks and solicitation techniques, and will probably be presented with fewer
disputes over the validity of cards. Finally, the union will be on surer ground in
presenting "Selection of Union Agent" cards to the employer and will not have
to contend with the numerous protestations of "good faith doubt" that arise
today.8' Although there is no sure way of eliminating the effects of oral mis-
representations made by organizers during card solicitation, standardized card
forms and procedures will strengthen the reliability of card checks and will more
closely approximate the "laboratory conditions" surrounding the conduction
of an election.
79. This requirement could be waived upon testimony that the employee received a
full and truthful explanation of their contents in his native tongue.
80. These mandatory flyers might be made available without cost to the unions and
employers at the local Board office to prevent too great a financial burden on them.
81. See Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 Yale L.J. 805, 828-36 (1966).
